Wykład odbędzie się we wtorek 8 maja 2018 o godz. 9.45 w sali nr 130 Instytutu Filozofii (ul. Koszarowa 3 budynek 20 , I pietro) Traditionally, vagueness has been considered as either epistemic or representational phenomenon, i.e. indeterminacy in either knowledge or conceptual meaning resulting in fuzzy extensions of vague terms. In recent decades, however, more and more people argue that one is to allow vagueness into ontology as a part of reality itself. Whoever argues in this way must overcome a famous argument originally by G. Evans according to which vague objects imply indeterminate identity that turns out to be incoherent. The paper shows various positions on the matter and assesses their respective merits.
wtorek, 1 maja 2018
wykład pt. " Is Vagueness Purely Semantic or Also Ontic Phenomenon?"
Instytut Filozofii UWr zaprasza na wykład pt. " Is Vagueness Purely Semantic or Also Ontic Phenomenon?", który wygłosi dr Petr Dvořák (Czeska Akademia Nauk, Praga).
Wykład odbędzie się we wtorek 8 maja 2018 o godz. 9.45 w sali nr 130 Instytutu Filozofii (ul. Koszarowa 3 budynek 20 , I pietro) Traditionally, vagueness has been considered as either epistemic or representational phenomenon, i.e. indeterminacy in either knowledge or conceptual meaning resulting in fuzzy extensions of vague terms. In recent decades, however, more and more people argue that one is to allow vagueness into ontology as a part of reality itself. Whoever argues in this way must overcome a famous argument originally by G. Evans according to which vague objects imply indeterminate identity that turns out to be incoherent. The paper shows various positions on the matter and assesses their respective merits.
Wykład odbędzie się we wtorek 8 maja 2018 o godz. 9.45 w sali nr 130 Instytutu Filozofii (ul. Koszarowa 3 budynek 20 , I pietro) Traditionally, vagueness has been considered as either epistemic or representational phenomenon, i.e. indeterminacy in either knowledge or conceptual meaning resulting in fuzzy extensions of vague terms. In recent decades, however, more and more people argue that one is to allow vagueness into ontology as a part of reality itself. Whoever argues in this way must overcome a famous argument originally by G. Evans according to which vague objects imply indeterminate identity that turns out to be incoherent. The paper shows various positions on the matter and assesses their respective merits.
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